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Abstract
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing
actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent
signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, signals will
tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for reelection. This generates a skew
distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election.
We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.
JEL Classifications: D72, D78, D82.
Keywords: Signalling, Incumbency advantage, Supermajority.
1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that incumbent politicians can take actions in order to affect
voters’ perception of their types, and that such signalling has the potential to explain
important empirical phenomena. For example, it has been argued that high-ability in-
cumbents may have incentives to engineer pre-election booms in order to distinguish
themselves from low-ability ones [Rogoff (1990), Rogoff and Sibert (1988)]. Signalling
has also been used to explain “pandering”, where the incumbent may have incentives
to ignore private information and pander to the prior opinion of the median voter [e.g.
Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Morelli and Van Weelden (2011a)],
and “posturing”, where the incumbent puts effort on a divisive issue that helps signal the
congruence of his or her preferences with the majority [e.g. Morelli and Van Weelden
(2011b), Acemoglu et al. (2011)].
This paper identifies a new important implication of signalling opportunities that are
available only, or mainly, to the incumbent. As long as voters are rational, receiving
a signal will not bias their evaluation of the incumbent on average. However because
incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just
above the threshold needed for reelection. This generates a skew distribution of signals
leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election.
It is well known that incumbents enjoy disproportionate reelection rates, even in coun-
tries where the electoral process is generally deemed to be free and fair [Gelman and King
(1990)]. In part, this phenomenon can be explained by selection: the pool of incumbents
who run for reelection may contain a disproportionately large fraction of high-quality
politicians. However, there is a broad consensus, recently buttressed by new empirical
findings aiming at controlling for selection [Ansolabehere et al. (2000), Lee (2008), Levitt
and Wolfram (1997)], that incumbency per se has a causal effect on election outcomes.1
In other words incumbency confers direct electoral benefits even when candidates are of
similar quality. This paper shows that such a causal incumbency advantage is a natural
side-effect of the advantage that sitting politicians have in being able to signal their type.2
We present a model in which voters choose between an incumbent and a challenger,
with both politicians drawn from the same symmetric distribution of three types: low,
1Levitt and Wolfram (1997) compare repeated pairings of candidates for election to the US Congress,
in an attempt to control for the quality of incumbent and challenger. They find that the winner of
the previous race has on average a 4% higher vote share in the second pairing. Ansolabehere et al.
(2000) compare county-level vote shares after redistricting in US Congressional elections. They find that
incumbents receive 4% fewer votes in counties which have been redistricted into their constituencies, than
in counties which remained in their constituency for both elections. Lee (2008) compares bare winners
and bare losers of elections. He finds that a party which barely wins a Congressional election has on
average an 8% higher vote share and a 35% higher probability of winning the next election.
2An alternative explanation for a causal incumbency advantage is that incumbents “improve” with
tenure, either thanks to the accumulated experience, or because seniority makes them more influential
[Dick and Lott (1993)]. This explanation and our signalling explanation are not mutually exclusive.
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middle, and high quality.3 This signal has three components: the true quality of the
incumbent, the signalling effort exerted by the incumbent, and noise.45 Under fairly mild
assumptions middling-quality incumbents exert the greatest signalling efforts, as high-
quality ones can rely on their true quality to convince voters, while low-quality ones are
discouraged by the excessive effort costs that would be required to fool voters. Therefore,
the distribution of signals observed by voters is skewed: more than 50 percent of signals
lead to posterior expected quality that is greater than the average quality (i.e., greater than
the expected quality of the challenger). As a result, more than 50 percent of incumbents
will be re-elected. This implies an incumbency advantage. In particular, middle-quality
incumbents win elections against challengers (whose expected quality is middle) more
than 50% of the time.
As already stated our paper contributes to the literature on signalling in games between
politicians and voters. Most of this literature is concerned with how signalling incentives
can explain some seemingly perverse policy outcome (e.g. an incentive to engineer a pre-
election boom). Hence, it is of central importance for these studies’ purposes that the
signalling action itself is directly welfare-relevant for the voters (it is typically a policy
decision). Our focus is not on how signalling leads to bad policies, but on how signalling
explains reelection outcomes. Hence, it is not important to us if signalling effort has
independent welfare implications. Accordingly, for simplicity we model signalling merely
as a message with no direct welfare relevance (though, of course, with potential indirect
welfare implications through the quality of the winner of the election).
The crucial assumption in our model is the asymmetry between the incumbent and
the challenger in their ability to signal; the voters receive a signal from incumbents, but
not from challengers. When the signal is interpreted as a policy outcome, it is clear why
only incumbents have the ability to signal. However, since we model signalling as simply
sending a message from the incumbent to the voters, another interpretation is as a form
of spin, propaganda, advertising, or persuasion.6 A large literature has documented that
3As will become clear it is not possible to get a causal incumbency-advantage result in a model with
only two types (which is the standard in the literature): three types is the minimum necessary for the
result.
4Our model is extremely similar to the Matthews and Mirman (1983) model of limit pricing, but
that paper does not derive analogues of either our incumbency advantage or supermajority results. One
advantage of having noise (which we think of as a realistic assumption) is that there exists a unique
equilibrium, and therefore we do not have to invoke any of the equilibrium refinements which are usually
necessary in the signalling literature.
5An interesting related paper is Martinez (2009). In his model politicians do not know their types, so
there is no heterogeneity in effort, however effort is hump-shaped in politicians’ prior reputation (which is
public information), for a similar reason as effort is hump-shaped in type in our model: because politicians
are trying to cross a threshold.
6In the political literature we find the following fitting definition of spin in Moloney (2001): “To ‘spin’
is to give the words describing a policy, personality or event a favourable gloss with the intention that
the mass media will use them to the political advantage of the spinner and so gain public support” (page
125); “...Spin is a weak or soft form of propaganda [...] where the activity can be identified as information
manipulation; where the information is more accurate than inaccurate, and where the purpose of the spin
is known, to enhance the standing of the government or opposition party...”(page 128).
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incumbents receive significantly more media coverage than challengers, Goldenberg and
Traugott (1984) for example find that US House incumbents receive more than 60% of the
combined media coverage before elections (see also Robinson (1981), Clarke and Evans
(1983), Graber (1989), Kahn (1991)).7 The widespread existence of state-owned media is
an additional channel through which incumbents can receive more coverage [Besley and
Prat (2006), Durante and Knight (2009)]. In fact, excess media coverage of incumbents
has often been studied as a cause of incumbency advantage [Prior (2006), Snyder and
Stromberg (2010)].8 With rational expectations, extra information about the incumbent
should not systematically bias voters’ beliefs. Our model offers an explanation in which
this casual effect can be reconciled with rational voters. Moreover it also rationalizes the
phenomenon of spin itself.
A closely related paper in the persuasion literature is the recent contribution by Ka-
menica and Gentzkow (2011). They find a message mechanism such that even though
the receiver is not fooled about the average quality of the sender, a majority of senders
is perceived as more likely to be of high quality. The difference between the two papers
is that, in our terminology, they allow the sender (politicians) to commit to an effort
function before learning their type. Senders can therefore exogenously choose a skewed
signal distribution that leads to an incumbency advantage. In contrast, we show that a
skew distribution of outcomes (and thus incumbency advantage) will arise even without
commitment.
Our main focus in the paper is positive, and lies in showing how signalling can lead
to incumbency advantage. However, our framework can also be used to derive some
normative implications, similar in spirit to Gersbach (2007; 2009; 2010), who argues for
supermajority reelection rules for incumbents. In particular we show that, with incumbent
signalling, voters can improve the average outcome by committing to a higher reelection
threshold than that which is optimal ex post. The marginal ex ante effect of raising the
threshold is to increase effort by those who were sending messages above the threshold,
and decrease effort by those who were sending messages below the threshold. In the no-
commitment equilibrium the types who send messages above the threshold are high quality
and medium quality, while those who send messages below the threshold are low quality,
thus the marginal effect of committing to a higher threshold is positive. In practice one way
such a commitment could be implemented is with a constitutional amendment requiring
a supermajority for an incumbent to be reelected, similar to a constitutional amendment
which sets a term limit on incumbents. This mechanism is most similar to the mechanism
7Gordon et al. (2007) identify one way in which challengers are able to signal their type: by the choice
of whether or not to enter the race.
8Cain et al. (1987) state that: “Incumbents win because they are better known and more favorably
evaluated by any wide variety of measures. And they are better known and more favorably evaluated
because, among other factors, they bombard constituents with missives containing a predominance of
favorable material, maintain extensive district office operations to service their constituencies, use modern
technology to target groups of constituents with particular policy interests, and vastly outspend their
opponents”(p10).
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in Gersbach (2009), though in his paper there are multiple equilibria, so the conclusion
depends on choosing a probability distribution over equilibria. Furthermore in Gersbach
(2009) the incumbent’s signalling effort is welfare improving to the society. He finds that
a higher vote threshold increases the average quality of reelected politicians as well as the
average effort. Because the effort is welfare improving, a supermajority increases welfare.
In this paper, effort is welfare neutral, and even though a supermajority always increases
the average quality of reelected politicians, it also decreases the probability of reelection
for good politicians. We show that this trade off is positive at the margin. This result
is a contribution to the literature on optimal electoral rules (Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998), Smart and Sturm (2006)).9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model,
and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the case of the simple majority
rule. Section 4 shows that under simple majority rule an incumbency advantage exists
in equilibrium. Section 5 shows that the optimal reelection rule is a supermajority rule.
Section 6 proposes an illustrative calibration, and Section 7 presents further discussions
of the relationship between incumbency advantage and optimal reelection thresholds, the
welfare significance of signalling, issues of implementation of the supermajority rule, and
possible extensions.
2 The Model
We study a game between an incumbent politician and a continuum of voters, where
the voters choose between the incumbent and a challenger politician (who is a passive
player in our setup). Both incumbent and challenger are defined by their talent θ which
is seen as a random variable. Talent may be understood as the quality of the politician, a
characteristic orthogonal to the political space, valued by every voter in the same way.10
Examples of what might be called talent are competence and honesty. The talents of
both politicians are drawn from the same distribution and are privately known only to
the politicians themselves.
We assume that the distribution of talents is symmetric and has three types, i.e.
θ ∈ Θ ≡ {θL, θM , θH}, with equal distance δ between the extremes and the middle types
(θH − θM = θM − θL ≡ δ), and where a politician has the same probability p of being of
high or low talent (p = Pr(θH) = Pr(θL)).
We have assumed symmetry in the distribution of types because we want to isolate
the effect of signalling on incumbency advantage. If the underlying distribution of talent
9Note that a term limit on incumbents can be thought of as a special case of a majority rule, however
in our model a term limit will never induce higher welfare than a simple majority, because the expected
value of a chosen incumbent is bounded below by the expected value of a challenger.
10This concept is also called in the literature quality or valence [Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000);
Carrillo and Castanheira (2002); Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009; 2008)].
4
was skewed, for example if the median talent was above the mean, then we would expect
an incumbency advantage even without the ability to manipulate messages (because more
than half of politicians would be above the expected type of the challenger, so more than
half of incumbents would be re-elected). Thus the overall advantage will depend both on
the skewness of the distribution of types, and the skewness in signals induced by signalling.
We consider a three-type distribution because it is the minimum required to generate an
incumbency advantage. Simulations with continuous distributions make us believe that
the result is true more generally, but we leave derivations for future work.
The asymmetry between incumbent and challenger comes from the fact that before the
election voters receive a signal of the incumbent’s quality. The signal has two components,
a “message” sent by the incumbent, and a noise component. The message, denoted by
θ˜, is in turn an additive combination of the politician’s talent and his effort, θ˜ = θ + e.
The cost of effort is increasing and convex, denoted by c(·), and incurred only by the
incumbent. That the message is increasing in costly effort is the key assumption of the
paper. Since each incumbent’s starting point is her true quality, this has the implication
that lower quality incumbents must make a greater effort than higher quality ones to send
the same message. One can think about this assumption as roughly capturing the idea
that for an incumbent it is relatively easier to spin as a success a middling policy outcome
than a policy disaster.
Voters receive the message with some noise, representing the many unobservables
which contribute to political outcomes, and constrain voters’ ability to infer a politician’s
quality. Both the incumbency advantage and the supermajority result can be derived
without noise, but noise eliminates pooling and semi-separating equilibria and hence allows
us to explore the comparative statics of the equilibrium. Also, noise generates a realistically
continuous distribution of vote shares, which we use in our calibration. Finally, assuming
that incumbents’s messages are received with noise is simply realistic.
To differentiate between the information sent by the incumbent and the information
received by voters, we have called message what the incumbent sends and signal what
the voters receive. The signal is equal to the original message, plus noise, s = θ˜ + ,
where  is drawn from a continuous distribution with mean zero, symmetric and single
peaked density distribution function g(·) with full support on the real line and cumulative
distribution function G(·).
Note that all voters receive the same signal, i.e. the noise is common to all voters.11
However, voters differ in their preferences for the incumbent. We assume that the utility
of voter i given an incumbent with talent θ is given by:
ui(θ) = θ + ηi (1)
where ηi represents voter i’s relative preference for the incumbent over the challenger. We
11We discuss in footnote 23 the general effects of heterogenous information.
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assume that ηi has a continuous density h(·), strictly positive on [η, η], where η (η) might
be minus (plus) infinity. We denote the cumulative distribution function by H(·) and we
assume that both its mean and its median equal 0.
This model can be seen as a reduced form of a model in which, after the incumbent
sends his message to the population, both incumbent and challenger (office motivated)
announce their political platforms with Downsian commitment [Downs (1957)]. In any
subgame perfect equilibrium of such a model, there would be convergence of platforms
to the median voter’s preferences, and hence the choice of effort is taken as if the voters
had preferences given by (1).12 Finally, we assume that voters support the incumbent
when indifferent, though because the noise distribution is atomless, the probability of an
indifference occurring is vanishingly small.
Politicians are only office-motivated. Being in office leads to a reward of pi. Their only
cost is the cost of effort. Thus the incumbent chooses the level of effort to maximize
V (θ, e) = piPr(reelection|θ, e)− c(e)
The game has two decision stages. In the first stage the incumbent sends a message
that the voters receive with some noise. In the second stage the voters cast their vote.
The outcome of the election depends on the votes cast and the reelection rule. We will
denote a reelection rule by q when the incumbent needs at least the fraction q of the votes
in order to be re-elected.
In Section 3 we consider the particular case of simple majority rule for which q = 1
2
.
Given voters’ preferences a simple majority rule is equivalent to giving all power to the
median voter. On the other hand, as we will discuss later in Section 5, a supermajority
rule is equivalent to giving all the power to a voter who is opposed to or dislikes the
incumbent. In order to be re-elected the incumbent’s talent should be high enough to
gain the support of this hostile voter.
Given a reelection rule q, an equilibrium is defined by an effort rule, eq : Θ→ [0,+∞)
for the incumbent, and a voting rule, vq : R× [η, η]→ {0, 1} for the voters such that:
(i) eq(θ) ∈ arg maxe{piPr(reelection|vq(·), θ + e, q)− c(e)}
(ii) vq(s, ηi) = 1 if and only if E[θ|s, eq(·)] + ηi ≥ θM
where Pr(reelection|vq(·), θ + e, q) is the probability of reelection given the voting rule
12There is a recent literature that focuses on the interaction between the choice of effort and the choice
of platform [see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000); Aragones and Palfrey (2002); Carrillo and Castanheira
(2002); Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009); Meirowitz (2008)] when there is no asymmetry between
the candidates. In some of these papers there is divergence of platforms in equilibrium. We abstract from
the possibility of divergence and we choose instead to work with a model that corresponds to the more
standard convergence outcome because the focus is not on the interaction between valence and political
competition.
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vq(·), the message θ˜ = θ + e and the reelection rule q, and E[θ|s, eq(·)] is the expected
talent of the incumbent given that the public signal is s and using a posterior distribution
of the incumbent’s talent consistent with the equilibrium effort eq(·).
From condition (ii), and given that all voters observe the same signal s, it is clear that
whenever vq(s, ηi) = 1 then vq(s, ηj) = 1 for all ηj ≥ ηi. Therefore, given a reelection rule
q, the incumbent is re-elected if and only if the voter with preference ηq = H
−1(1 − q)
supports him. The probability of reelection can be written as:
Pr(reelection|vq(·), θ + e, q) =
∫ +∞
−∞
vq(θ + e+ , ηq)g()d
Notice, that for some extreme reelection rules it might be the case that the outcome of
the election is independent of the signal received by the voters because the preferences for
or against the incumbent of the critical voter ηq outweighs any realization of the talent of
the incumbent. To distinguish these uninteresting cases we denote by q (q) the minimum
(maximum) reelection rule such that the outcome of the reelection is not predetermined.13
Finally, we will say that the noise distribution g(·) satisfies the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property (MLRP) if whenever θ˜1 > θ˜2, then
g(s−θ˜1)
g(s−θ˜2) increases in s.
14 The MLRP
implies that higher signals lead to higher posterior distributions of the talent (in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance).
The following proposition gives some properties of the equilibria and states that in
equilibrium the incumbent is re-elected whenever the public signal is equal to or above a
certain threshold, and is not re-elected otherwise.
Proposition 1. For any reelection rule q ∈ (q, q), if the cost of effort, c(·), is strictly
convex and the distribution of noise satisfies the MLRP, then any equilibrium e∗q(·) and
v∗q (·) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Voter i’s best response is a threshold rule:
vq(s, ηi) =
{
0 if s < ki
1 if s ≥ ki
(2)
where ki is determined by E[θ|s = ki, e∗q(·)] + ηi = θM whenever this equation has a so-
lution, and ki = +∞ (−∞) if E[θ|s, e∗q(·)] + ηi < (>) θM for all s ∈ R. Moreover, ki is
decreasing in the preference parameter ηi.
(ii) The incumbent is re-elected if and only if the public signal is above a threshold kq,
where kq is given by:
E[θ|s = kq, e∗q(·)] = θM −H−1(1− q) (3)
13More precisely, q = 1−H(δ) and q = 1−H(−δ).
14This definition corresponds to the special case of the MLRP defined by Milgrom (1981) when the
signal structure is additive.
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(iii) The incumbent’s optimal effort solves:
pig(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq) = c′(e∗q(θ))
pig′(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq)− c′′(e∗q(θ)) < 0
(4)
Moreover, the incumbent’s message is increasing in his type (i.e. θ˜L < θ˜M < θ˜H)
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium the voters follow a threshold rule
such that they support the incumbent if and only if the signal received is above a threshold
that is decreasing in their preferences for the incumbent. At the threshold ki, voter i is
indifferent between supporting the incumbent and appointing a new politician.
Part (ii) states that for reelection, the signal received must be above the threshold kq
that leaves indifferent the critical voter with preference ηq = H
−1(1− q).
Part (iii) states the first and second order conditions for the optimal effort given that
the expected payoff of the incumbent can now be written as:
V (θ, e, q) = piG(θ + e− kq)− c(e)
In particular the optimal level of effort is such that the marginal increase in the probability
of reelection should equal the marginal cost of effort.
It is important to note that the incumbent’s message is increasing in his type. Intu-
itively, all incumbents (independent of their type) have the same reward from re-election,
however it is more costly for low talented incumbents to send high messages. If an incum-
bent finds worth to exert some effort to reach the reward, then those more talented will
strictly benefit to match that message. The monotonicity of the message together with
the MLRP assumption implies that the expected talent given the realization of a signal
is increasing on the signal, and will be widely used in the rest of the paper.
Finally, to guarantee that the local first and second order condition are sufficient for
a global optimum we assume throughout the paper the following condition:
inf
e
c′′(e) > pi sup

g′() (5)
Condition (5) requires the cost function to be sufficiently convex, so that the marginal
cost cuts only once the marginal benefit.
The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to that of Theorem 1 in Matthews and Mirman
(1983) regarding limit pricing and therefore is relegated to the Appendix.15
15The setup in Matthews and Mirman (1983) is close to ours: a monopoly wants to deter the entrant
of a possible challenger, and they do so by lowering their price, to signal lower profitability in the
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3 Simple Majority Rule
As a benchmark consider the simple majority rule q = 1
2
. Notice that given the assump-
tions on the voters’ preferences for the incumbent, equation (3) becomes:16
E[θ|s = k∗] = θM (6)
where k∗ denotes the equilibrium threshold in the simple majority case. In other words,
the simple majority rule is equivalent to giving all the power to the median voter, the
voter that is ex-ante (before receiving the signal) indifferent between the incumbent and
the challenger. The incumbent will be re-elected if and only if this voter believes him to
have a higher than average talent.
The equilibrium for the simple majority rule has the following properties:
Proposition 2. With a simple majority rule, the equilibrium is unique. The effort levels
satisfy eM > eL = eH ≡ e∗ with e∗ = c′−1(pig(θH − θM)) and the threshold signal is given
by k∗ = θM + e∗.
Proof For clarity we omit the reference to the electoral rule on the equilibrium variables.
Given the talent distribution, upon receiving a signal s = k∗, equation (6) becomes:∑
j θjg(k
∗ − θ˜j)Pr(θj)∑
j g(k
∗ − θ˜j)Pr(θj)
= θM
and given Pr(θH) = Pr(θL) and θH − θM = θM − θL, it simplifies to:
g(k∗ − θ˜H) = g(k∗ − θ˜L) (7)
The first order conditions for the equilibrium effort (4) together with equation (7) imply
that eH = eL. Denote by e
∗ this effort level.
Then given the symmetry of the noise distribution, equation (7) implies that the
equilibrium threshold will be exactly half-way between the signals sent by the high and
low type incumbents:
k∗ =
θ˜H + θ˜L
2
= θM + e
∗ (8)
To see that eM > e
∗ notice that, from the single-peakedness and symmetry of g:
pig(k∗ − θM − e∗) > pig(k∗ − θL − e∗) = c′(e∗)
market. Analogously, a politician exerts effort to signal their type. Note that Proposition 1 is true for an
arbitrary distribution of types, not just for our three-type distribution. In particular, it would be true
for a continuous distribution of types.
16For clarity we suppress reference to the effort function e∗1/2(·).
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that is, the marginal benefit for an incumbent with type θM of exerting effort e
∗ outweighs
the marginal cost of exerting this level of effort. Therefore, eM > e
∗.
Finally, replacing k∗ = θM + e∗ into the first order conditions for e∗ given by equation
(4), we obtain the equilibrium level e∗:
c′(e∗) = pig(δ)
where δ ≡ θH − θM = θM − θL represents the dispersion of the talent distribution17. 
The proof of Proposition 2 can be visualized in Figure 1. Both the talents and the
messages can be read on the horizontal axis. The upward sloping lines represent the
marginal costs of effort for each type. Consider the messages sent by the low-quality and
high-quality incumbents, θ˜L and θ˜H . By Proposition 1, θ˜L < θ˜H . Since the median voter
is indifferent between middle types and the challenger, she will be indifferent between
the incumbent and challenger only when the signal is equally likely to be from either
a high or a low type. Therefore using the symmetry of the noise distribution she will
set the threshold of acceptance k∗ at the midpoint between θ˜L and θ˜H . Given k∗, the
marginal benefit of effort at θ˜ is pig(θ˜ − k∗), i.e. the marginal increase in the probability
of being reelected, which is also depicted in Figure 1. By the symmetry of g, the marginal
benefit is symmetric around k∗, and since k∗ is the middle point between θ˜L and θ˜H ,
the marginal benefits of effort at both points are equal. In equilibrium marginal benefits
equal marginal costs, and hence the equilibrium efforts exerted by the low-quality and
high-quality incumbents must be the same e∗L = e
∗
H = e
∗. Finally, returning to the middle
types, if they exerted the same effort e∗ they would face a higher marginal benefit of
effort, due to the single-peakedness of the of the marginal benefit function. Thus middle
types increase their effort till their marginal cost equates their marginal benefit, at θ˜M .
Note that although the message θ˜ is strictly increasing in an incumbent’s type, the effort
is non-monotonic in types.
The effort level e∗ is increasing in pi and decreasing in the dispersion of the incumbent’s
talent δ. These results are very intuitive, a direct change in the marginal benefit or
cost changes the effort level accordingly. Moreover, if the distance between incumbents
increases then it is more difficult to fool the voters by exerting effort and therefore the
marginal benefit of effort goes down and they exert less effort.
The medium type’s effort level eM is also decreasing in the dispersion δ, because a
lower e∗ corresponds to a lower k, and therefore a lower incentive to exert effort. The
medium type’s effort is also increasing in pi, both because of the direct effect (a higher
incentive to exert effort), and through its indirect effect of raising e∗, and therefore k.
Assuming that the noise is normally distributed with variance σ2 and mean zero, we
17The distance between the talents of the incumbents is a measure of the dispersion of the distribution.
In fact the variance of the talents is given by: V ar(θ) = 2p(θH − θM )2 = 2pδ2
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pig(θ˜ − k∗)
θL θM θH
c′(eL) c′(eM)
c′(eH)
︷ ︸︸ ︷e∗
θ˜L
︷ ︸︸ ︷e∗
θ˜H
︷ ︸︸ ︷eM
θ˜M
k∗ = θM + e∗
Figure 1: Equilibrium
can further study how the equilibrium effort level changes with the variance of the noise.
The change in the equilibrium effort with respect to the variance of the noise depends
on the relative size of the variance of the noise and the square of the dispersion of the
incumbents:
∂e∗/∂σ2 < 0 if and only if σ
2
 > δ
2 (9)
To understand this result consider the following two extreme scenarios. Suppose that the
signal is extremely noisy, then voters do not infer much from the signal and incumbents
exert very little effort. If the variance of the signal decreases making the signal more
informative, then reelection will be more responsive to the signal received and incumbents
will exert more effort. On the other hand, if the signal is very precise, incumbents are not
going to be able to fool the voters and exert little effort. Condition (9) says that whether
we consider the signal extremely noisy or very precise depends on the relative variances
of the two distributions.
4 Incumbency Advantage
One interesting feature of the equilibrium is that the incumbents with middle talent are
the ones that exert higher effort. The reason is that the equilibrium threshold is closer to
their types and hence they have greater incentive to exert effort. This extra effort from the
incumbents with middle talent implies that the distribution of the messages, signals, and
ultimately of expected types, will be negatively skewed (the median is above the mean)
leading to our result of an incumbency advantage.
In the introduction we have characterized a causal incumbency advantage as a situation
in which, on average, incumbents have a better-than-50% chance of reelection against
a challenger with similar intrinsic characteristics. Because the quality distribution of
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incumbents running for reelection is identical to the quality distribution of challengers,
in our model this is equivalent to saying that on average incumbents are reelected more
than 50% of the time, and this will be our definition of incumbency advantage.
Proposition 3. Under simple majority there is an incumbency advantage.
Proof From Proposition 2, eM > e
∗. The probability of reelection for an incumbent
with talent θj that sends message θ˜j is then:
Pr(reelection | θ˜j) = Pr(θ˜j +  > k∗) = 1−G(k∗ − θj − ej)
The unconditional probability of reelection is therefore:
Pr(s ≥ k∗) = p(1−G(k∗ − θ˜H)) + p(1−G(k∗ − θ˜L)) + (1− 2p)(1−G(k∗ − θ˜M))
= p+ (1− 2p)(1−G(k∗ − θ˜M))
> 1
2
(10)
Where the second equality follows because G(k∗− θ˜H) = 1−G(k∗− θ˜L) and the inequality
because eM > e
∗ so θ˜M > k∗. 
Intuitively, when the median voter chooses whether to reappoint the incumbent or
not, she compares her updated belief about the talent of the incumbent with the expected
talent of the challenger. In doing so she can ignore middle type incumbents because they
have just average talent, and hence taking into account the equilibrium messages of the
incumbents, the threshold signal would be just the middle point between the messages
sent by the low and the high signals. But given that the incumbents with middle talent
exert more effort than the others, the message θ˜M will exceed the threshold and therefore
they will be re-elected in more than half of their attempts.
It is important to note that in this model there is an incumbency advantage on average.
In particular, high-quality incumbents will win a majority of elections, and low-quality
incumbents will lose a majority of elections (as the voters have no information on the
quality of the challenger, so the reelection depends exclusively on the expected quality of
the incumbent). Because of the symmetry in the distribution of types and the fact that
high- and low-quality incumbents exert the same effort, the overall combined reelection
rates of low- and high-quality incumbents is exactly 50%. Hence, whether or not there is
on average an incumbency advantage depends on whether or not middle-type incumbents
are re-elected more than 50% of the time. Since middle-type incumbents send a message
that is above the voters’ reelection threshold, a majority of them will indeed be reelected.
This is fully consistent with the empirical literature on causal incumbency advantage.
That literature captures the incumbency advantage among candidates of similar quality,
but, as quality is unobservable, it cannot estimate separate incumbency advantages for
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different levels of quality. Instead, it can only estimate the average advantage across qual-
ity pairs. Hence, it is perfectly possible that at low quality levels there is an incumbency
disadvantage, as in our model.
Relatedly, it is also important to note that just because signalling leads to an incum-
bency advantage does not imply that signalling is socially harmful. Consider what would
happen in our model if signalling were not possible (equivalently, if effort was infinitely
costly). The reelection threshold would again be halfway between the low and high mes-
sages, but there would be no incumbency advantage, because the middle type would not
exert any effort. However voter welfare would be the same as in the case with signalling,
because although fewer middle types would be reelected, the welfare value of middle types
is neutral anyway.18
5 Supermajority
In this section we consider the social planner’s problem of maximizing the total welfare of
the voters by choosing a reelection rule (we treat the welfare of the incumbent politician as
negligible when computing the social welfare). We prove that the simple majority rule is
suboptimal and that the welfare maximizing rule must be a supermajority rule (q > 1
2
).19
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that under simple majority voters would
be better off if they could commit to a higher threshold to re-elect the incumbent. This
commitment is not credible because ex post it is efficient to re-elect the incumbent if the
updated beliefs indicate that he is above average (i.e., if the median voter would prefer
him). We then propose a way to implement this commitment by setting a supermajority
rule that takes decision power from the median voter and gives it to a voter with a partisan
position somewhat against the incumbent.
Proposition 4. Under simple majority, the welfare maximizing reelection threshold is
above the equilibrium threshold k∗.
Proof Given a threshold k, the expected welfare can be expressed as the value of the
outside option (the expected value of a challenger, θM), plus the expected change in value
18The neutrality of signalling for welfare purposes may be specific to our three-type models. For general
distributions of types, under simple majority the kind of signalling we model could be welfare improving
or welfare reducing. The point we are making here is that it is not necessarily welfare reducing. What we
believe is always true is that irrespective of the welfare consequences of signalling under simple majority,
welfare can always be improved by increasing the reelection threshold, which is the subject of the next
section.
19This seems to contradict the literature on biased contests [Meyer (1991; 1992)] in which favoring
early success by increasing the probability of success in later contests might be optimal. However, in the
setup of those papers, either no action (effort) was required from the contesters, or all the contester had
the same known ability (no types), and hence the incentive effect that arise from the supermajority rule
in the present paper cannot be present there.
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from retaining the incumbent:20
EW = θM + pPr(θ˜H +  ≥ k)(θH − θM) + pPr(θ˜L +  ≥ k)(θL − θM)
= θM + pδ(G(θ˜H − k)−G(θ˜L − k))
(11)
The optimal threshold is then determined by the first order condition:
∂EW
∂k
= pδ
(
g(θ˜H − k)(∂eH
∂k
− 1)− g(θ˜L − k)(∂eL
∂k
− 1)
)
= 0 (12)
At the equilibrium threshold, g(θ˜H−k∗) = g(θ˜L−k∗), therefore if we evaluate the derivative
(12) at k∗, the direct effect on welfare of a change in the threshold is zero. However, the
change in the threshold also affects the choice of effort. Recall that the optimal level of
effort given a threshold k satisfies the following first and second order conditions:
pig(θj + ej − k) = c′(ej)
pig′(θj + ej − k)− c′′(ej) < 0
(13)
In particular, totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to k and rear-
ranging:
∂ej
∂k
=
pig′(θj + ej − k)
pig′(θj + ej − k)− c′′(ej) (14)
and using the second order condition and the fact that g′(θL + eL − k∗) > 0 > g′(θH +
eH − k∗) we have that:
∂eH
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
> 0 and
∂eL
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
< 0
Hence, plugging this into (12), the indirect effect on welfare of a raise in the threshold is
positive. Increasing the threshold causes θH to exert more effort
21 while θL will reduce
his effort, leading to more separation between the incumbents’ signals and as a result an
increase in welfare.
We have shown that welfare is improved by marginally increasing the threshold from
its Nash equilibrium level. However this is not sufficient to show that a threshold higher
than the Nash equilibrium threshold is optimal, because the welfare function may not
be single-peaked. We therefore demonstrate below that for any threshold k < k∗ the
correspondent welfare is strictly lower than the welfare at the equilibrium threshold k∗.
To see that, first notice that given θj, the optimal effort level ej defined by equation (13)
is a single-peaked function of the threshold k. For a given θj, the effort ej(·) is increasing
for k < θj +c
′−1(pig(0)) and decreasing otherwise. Moreover, given equation (13), we have
20The partisan preferences (ηi) disappear from this expression, because of their zero mean.
21A marginally higher threshold also leads the middle θM to exert more effort. To see this observe that
θM + eM − k∗ = eM − e∗ > 0 and hence g′(θM + eM − k∗) < 0 and ∂eM∂k |k=k∗ > 0.
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eL(·) eH(·)
k∗ k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θH − θL
Figure 2: Effort functions
the following identity:
eL(k − (θH − θL)) ≡ eH(k)
so the optimal effort function of the low type is a horizontal shift to the left of the effort
of the high type (see Figure 2).
At the equilibrium threshold, eL(k
∗) = eH(k∗) ≡ e∗ so eL(k∗) = eL(k∗ − (θH − θL))
which implies that k∗ is on the downward-sloping part of curve eL(·) and on the upward-
sloping part of eH(·). A representation of the effort functions can be seen in Figure 2.
Consider k < k∗, then eL(k) > eH(k) and hence the distance between the high and
low messages under threshold k is smaller than under threshold k∗:
θ˜H(k)− θ˜L(k) < θ˜∗H − θ˜∗L (15)
Notice that by the symmetry of the noise distribution, the following two remarks are
satisfied:
R1: Whenever two points are at a fixed distance h, G(x)−G(x− h) is maximized at
x = h
2
, that is, when the two points are equidistant to the mean.22
R2: Given two points equidistant to the mean, the difference in the cumulative distri-
bution is increasing in the distance between the two points:
∂
∂h
[
G(
h
2
)−G(−h
2
)
]
=
1
2
(g(
h
2
) + g(−h
2
)) > 0
We can now conclude that for any threshold k < k∗ the welfare under threshold k is
22To see this consider the first order condition with respect to x: g(x) − g(x − h) = 0, and by the
symmetry of g(·), this implies x = −(x− h) or x = h2 .
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lower than under the equilibrium threshold k∗:
EW (k) = θM + pδ(G(θ˜H(k)− k)−G(θ˜L(k)− k))
≤ θM + pδ(G( θ˜H(k)−θ˜L(k)2 )−G(− θ˜H(k)−θ˜L(k)2 ))
≤ θM + pδ(G( θ˜
∗
H−θ˜∗L
2
)−G(− θ˜∗H−θ˜∗L
2
))
= EW (k∗)
where the first inequality follows from R1 and the second from R2 and (15). 
Proposition 4 implies that the voters would be better off if they could commit to re-
elect incumbents that have expected talent above a level which is strictly higher than the
ex-ante average talent. An increase in the threshold will cause high types to exert more
effort and low types to exert less effort. For both types their efforts will not offset the
increase in the threshold, so both will be re-elected with a lower probability. But it is the
larger fall in the probability of low-type reelection that increases welfare.
This higher threshold is not optimal ex post, because it asks the voters to not re-
elect some politicians with expected talent strictly greater than the expected talent of
the challenger. It is not clear that individual voters have access to credible commitment
devices, allowing them to implement the higher threshold. However committing to a
higher threshold has a natural interpretation with respect to the electorate as a whole: a
constitutional rule such that incumbents will only be allowed a second term if they exceed
some threshold of the vote share strictly greater than one half, i.e. a supermajority rule.
If all voters are identical then this rule, of course, has no effect. However, if the
voters differ in their preferences for the incumbent, in the way we have assumed, then a
supermajority rule transfers the decision power from the median voter to a voter that is
ideologically opposed to the incumbent.23 Therefore a supermajority rule acts in effect as
a commitment device that sets a higher threshold of talent for reelection.
Proposition 5. The welfare maximizing reelection rule is a supermajority rule (qW >
1
2
).
Proof Given a threshold k, there is a reelection rule that implements that threshold in
equilibrium. Denote by ek(·) the optimal effort the incumbent exerts if he faces threshold
k,24 as a function of his type. We define q(k) as follows:
q(k) = 1−H(θM − E[θ|s = k, ek(·)]) (16)
23Another source of voter heterogeneity may be differential information. However if agents are ratio-
nal, and there is common knowledge of rationality, then it is difficult to argue that the heterogeneous
information will not be efficiently aggregated. Information can be indirectly passed through, for example,
opinion polls. If a voter compares her own private signal with the aggregated signals of 1000 people in
an opinion poll, then the latter would seem to swamp the former. Also voters should vote using the ex-
pectations conditional on being decisive; this force will generally make a supermajority rule less effective
[see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)].
24The effort function ek(·) solves equation (13).
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Clearly, setting the reelection rule q = q(k) leads to the equilibrium effort e∗q(k)(·) ≡
ek(·) and to the equilibrium threshold kq(k) = k. To prove Proposition 5 it would be
sufficient to prove that q(k) is increasing in k. However this need not be true everywhere.
As the threshold gets past a certain point both high and low types will react to an increase
in the threshold by lowering their levels of effort (see Figure 2), thus an increase in the
threshold could correspond to a lower expected quality from a signal sent at the threshold.
To prove the result we proceed in two steps. First we note that, by Proposition 2,
the equation q(k) = 1
2
has a unique solution at k∗, the equilibrium threshold of a simple
majority case. Then we show that q(·) is strictly increasing at k∗, the equilibrium threshold
of the simple majority case. Since q(·) is continuous, and only cuts the line q(k) = 1
2
once,
this implies that for any k > k∗, q(k) > q(k∗) = 1
2
.
Formally, q(k) = 1
2
if and only if E[θ|s = k, ek(·)] = θM . By equation (6), k∗ satisfies
E[θ|s = k∗, ek∗(·)] = θM . To see that k∗ is the unique solution to this equation notice
that if E[θ|s = k, ek(·)] = θM , it has to be the case that θ˜L(k) and θ˜H(k) are equidistant
to the threshold k. This implies that ek(θL) = ek(θH) = k − θM . Substituting this in the
first order conditions leads to ek(θL) = e
∗ = c′−1(pi(θH − θM)) and k = k∗.
We now show that q(k) is increasing at k∗, or equivalently, that E[θ|s = k, ek(·)] is
increasing at k∗:
∂E[θ|s = k, ek(·)]
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
=
∂
∂k
[
(θH − θM)p[g(θ˜H − k)− g(θ˜L − k)]
p(g(θ˜H − k) + g(θ˜L − k)) + (1− 2p)g(θ˜M − k)
]∣∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
Denoting by D the denominator of this fraction:
∂E[θ|s=k,ek(·)]
∂k
∣∣∣
k=k∗
= (θH−θM )p
D
[
g′(θ˜H − k∗)(∂eH(k∗)∂k − 1)− g′(θ˜L − k∗)(∂eL(k
∗)
∂k
− 1)
]
> 0
where the inequality follows because D > 0, g′(θ˜H − k∗) = −g′(θ˜L − k∗) < 0 by the
equilibrium condition (11) and
∂ej(k
∗)
∂k
< 1 for j ∈ {H,L} by equation (14).
Therefore, denoting by kW the welfare maximizing threshold defined by equation (12),
kW > k
∗ by Proposition 4 and therefore the optimal reelection rule q(kW ) > 12 is a
supermajority rule. 
6 Numerical Illustration
In this section we present a simple numerical exercise to illustrate the potential magnitudes
involved in our model. The exercise has two modest goals. First, to show that a set of
parameters which seem intuitively reasonable (to the authors at least) can reproduce
incumbency effects of the right order of magnitude. Second, to show that the implications
for an optimal supermajority rule and its welfare effects are also of an intuitive magnitude.
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We assume that the noise and preference distributions are normal. We also assume
a quadratic cost of effort function, c(e) = c
2
e2, and without loss of generality we set
θM = 0 and pi = 1. The model has then five free parameters: (1) the variance of the noise
distribution σ2 , (2) the variance of the voters’ preferences σ
2
η, (3) the dispersion of the
talent distribution δ = θH − θM , (4) the probability of the high and low types p, and (5)
the parameter c in the cost-of-effort function.25
Numerical experimentation, documented below, shows that the optimal reelection
threshold is fairly insensitive to three of these five parameters: namely c, σ2 , and δ.
We thus fix these parameters at the arbitrary values of 0.25, 1, and 1.5. We then cal-
ibrate σ2η and p (to both of which the optimal supermajority rule is quite sensitive) by
targeting the causal incumbency advantage numbers reported in Lee (2008). That paper
uses a regression discontinuity analysis on U.S. Congressional elections, and finds that
the difference in the probability of winning an election between a marginal winner and a
marginal loser (i.e., a winner or loser of the previous election) is 35%, and that the average
difference in vote shares is of 7%.26 The model’s formulas for probability of reelection and
vote share are reported in the appendix. Solving these formulas to match Lee’s estimates
yields the probabilities of the low and high type to be p = 0.165 and a standard deviation
for voters’ ideological preferences of ση = 0.6. With these parameters, using equations
(12) and (16), the optimal supermajority rule is qW = 57%. This supermajority rule leads
to a welfare increase of 3.35% relative to simple majority.
In Figure 3 we plot the optimal supermajority rule as a function of each of the pa-
rameters, holding all remaining parameters fixed at the benchmark level. As can be seen
the optimal reelection threshold is fairly insensitive to c, σ2 , and δ, but not to p and
ση.
27 Figure 4 shows voters’ welfare as a function of the reelection rule: a supermajority
dominates simple majority for all supermajorities less than 61%.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper shows that in a model with noisy signalling and a threshold rule (which seems
a natural treatment of elections) the distribution of signals will be skew, such that the
expected type of the median signal will be above average, meaning that more than half
of incumbents will have expected type greater than the challenger, thus generating an
incumbency advantage.
25The sufficient condition (5) is translated in the following restriction for the parameters:
c ≥ 1
σ2
√
2pi
e−
1
2
26These numbers correspond to the party rather than the candidate incumbency advantage and average
vote share advantage. The problem with the establishment of a candidate incumbency advantage is that
there is an endogenous attrition of candidates that distorts the results.
27We restrict the support of c and σ to those values satisfying the sufficient condition 5.
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Figure 3: Optimal supermajority rule for changes in the parameters. Default parameters:
c = 14 , δ = 1.5, p = 0.165, σ = 1, ση = 0.6
We have derived these results using a three-type model. A natural question is whether
our results would extend to more general distributions of types. As already mentioned,
extensive numerical calculations suggest that both the positive and the normative pre-
dictions of the model are robust to a wide range of discrete and continuous distributions
of types, though a formal proof has eluded us thus far. Our conjecture, therefore, is
that incumbency advantage and the optimality of supermajority reelection thresholds are
generic features of models with noisy signalling by incumbents (as long as the signalling
has no direct welfare costs, of course. If there are direct costs the supermajority results
will depend on the relative benefits of improved screening and the cost of the signalling
action).28
We reiterate that in our model incumbency advantage is not a “problem”, nor is the
supermajority reelection threshold a solution to a pathology. However incumbency ad-
vantage is an indication that incumbents engage in signalling, and voters have then an
incentive to take advantage of such signalling by choosing the reelection threshold ap-
28A special case is when there are only two types (p = 0.5 in our model). Then there is no incumbency
advantage. It is still optimal to have a supermajority reelection rule, though.
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Figure 4: Welfare for different supermajority rules. (c = 14 , δ = 1.5, p = 0.165, σ = 1,
ση = 0.6.)
propriately. Note, too that the aim of the supermajority reelection threshold is not to
eliminate the incumbency advantage. In our calibration, a small incumbency advantage
remains even at the optimal threshold.29
As mentioned in the Introduction, our model can be seen as an extension of the noisy
signalling model of Matthews and Mirman (1983) which applies to limit pricing. Besides
limit pricing our approach may be fruitful in a number of other contexts in which thresh-
olds are observed. A natural analogue to elections is a hiring decision: internal candidates
may face an advantage simply due to their ability to signal [Chan (1996)], and firms may
therefore find it optimal to handicap internal candidates, to improve the separation of
types. More generally the results could be applied to competitions which award a prize
for demonstrating an ability which exceeds some threshold, such as acceptance into a
program conditional on the score on a standardized test. Without commitment, more ap-
plicants will pass the test than would pass under full information; and with commitment,
the administrators of the competition have an incentive to announce a higher threshold.
29Nor is it true, however, that at the optimal reelection threshold there will always be an incumbency
advantage. For example, when the probability of the middle type is zero, a supermajority threshold lowers
the probability of reelection for both types, thus lowering the average probability of reelection below 12 .
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin with two preliminary results. In Lemma 6 we show that if the cost function is
convex, the message sent by the incumbent is nondecreasing in his type.
Lemma 6. Given a reelection rule q, if c(·) is strictly convex, and eq(·) is a best response
to vq(·), then the corresponding message θ˜q(·) is non decreasing in θ.
Proof Let θ1 < θ2, and denote θ˜q(θi) by θ˜i and Pr(reelection|vq(·), θ˜i, q) by P (θ˜i).
Since eq(·) (and therefore θ˜q(·)) is a best response to vq(·),
piP (θ˜1)− c(θ˜1 − θ1) ≥ piP (θ˜2)− c(θ˜2 − θ1)
piP (θ˜2)− c(θ˜2 − θ2) ≥ piP (θ˜1)− c(θ˜1 − θ2)
Rearranging:
c(θ˜2 − θ1)− c(θ˜1 − θ1) ≥ pi(P (θ˜2)− P (θ˜1)) ≥ c(θ˜2 − θ2)− c(θ˜1 − θ2)
Since the distance between the two sets of points is the same: |(θ˜2− θ1)− (θ˜1− θ1)| =
|(θ˜2 − θ2)− (θ˜1 − θ2)|, the convexity of c(·) implies that θ˜1 ≤ θ˜2. 
In Lemma 7 we find sufficient conditions so that each voter’s best response is a thresh-
old rule.
Lemma 7. If θ˜q(·) is increasing and g(·) satisfies the MLRP, then voter i’s best response
is a threshold rule:
vq(s, ηi) =
{
0 if s < ki
1 if s ≥ ki
where ki is determined by E[θ|s = ki, eq(·)] + ηi = θM whenever this equation has a
solution, and ki = +∞ (−∞) if E[θ|s, eq(·)] + ηi < (>) θM for all s ∈ R. Moreover, ki is
decreasing in the preference parameter ηi.
Proof If the message θ˜(·) is strictly increasing in talent θ and the noise distribution g(·)
satisfies the MLRP (meaning expected message is strictly increasing in the signal) then
the conditional expectation of the talent must be increasing in the signal received by the
voter [Milgrom (1981)], i.e., if s1<s2 then E[θ|s1, eq(·)] < E[θ|s2, eq(·)].
Moreover, since no information is revealed from the challenger, the expected talent of
the challenger coincides with the mean of the talent distribution. Therefore, a voter with
partisan position ηi supports the incumbent if and only if:
E[θ|s, eq(·)] + ηi ≥ θM
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Since the conditional expectation is increasing and continuous, if the equation E[θ|s =
ki, eq(·)] + ηi = θM has a solution it has to be unique and voter i follows a threshold rule
in which v(s, ηi) = 1 if and only if s ≥ ki. Finally, by the monotonicity of the expectation,
ki is decreasing in ηi. 
Now we prove Proposition 1. For any q ∈ (q, q), and any equilibrium e∗q(·) and v∗q (·), if
c(·) is convex, Lemma 6 implies that θ˜∗q(·) is nondecreasing in theta. By the MLRP this
implies that E[θ|s, eq(·)] is nondecreasing in s, and therefore v∗q (·, ηq) is nondecreasing in
s where ηq = H
−1(1 − q). If v∗q (·, ηq) is constant, then the outcome of the reelections is
independent of the signal and hence the incumbent exert zero effort, e∗q(·) ≡ 0. But then
θ˜∗(θ) = θ is strictly increasing in θ and Lemma 7, together with the fact that q < q < q
imply that v∗q (·, ηq) is not constant. Therefore v∗q (·, ηq) must be a threshold rule with
some threshold kq. By the monotonicity of the expectation, v(kq, ηi) = 1 for all ηi ≥ ηq.
Moreover, for all s < kq, v(s, ηj) = 0 for all ηj < ηq. Therefore, the incumbent is re-elected
if and only if s ≥ kq, which proves part (ii).
Finally, given a threshold kq, the probability of reelection for an incumbent that sends
message θ˜ is Pr(θ˜ +  ≥ kq) = 1 − G(kq − θ˜) = G(θ˜ − kq), where the last equality comes
by the symmetry of the noise distribution. We can now write the expected payoff of the
incumbent as:
V (θ, e, q) = piG(θ + e− kq)− c(e)
then the (local) first and second order conditions for the optimal effort level, e∗q(·) are:
pig(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq) = c′(e∗q(θ))
pig′(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq)− c′′(e∗q(θ)) < 0
Finally, totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to θ:
∂e∗q(θ)
∂θ
=
−pig′(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq)
pig′(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq)− c′′(e∗q(θ))
> −1
where the last inequality follows by the convexity of c(·). This implies that the message
sent by the incumbent, θ˜q = θ + e
∗
q(θ), is strictly increasing in his type. 
A.2 Formulas for calibration
Given the quadratic cost and the normal distributions, the equilibrium of the model is
the following:
eH = eL = e
∗ = 1
cσ
φ( δ
σ
)
eM =
1
cσ
φ( eM−e
∗
σ
)
k∗ = 1
cσ
φ( δ
σ
)
(17)
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where φ(·) is the standard Normal density distribution.
The probability of winning for an incumbent is given by equation (10) and hence the
difference in the probability of winning between the incumbent and the challenger is:
x = 2Pr(reelection)− 1 = (1− 2p)
(
1− 2Φ
(
k∗ − eM
σ
))
(18)
where Φ(·) is the standard Normal cumulative distribution.
Note that Lee (2008) computes the difference in the probability of winning between a
marginal winner and a marginal loser. This avoids the problem of unobserved heterogene-
ity between winners and losers, if there is sufficient unpredictable noise in votes. Posterior
differences between a bare winner and loser thus must be caused by the fact of winning
or losing. In our model, all the politicians come from the same distribution of talents and
therefore they are ex-ante identical and the difference in the probability of winning comes
entirely from having been incumbent.
To compute the average vote share, note that given a signal s the share of voters that
support the incumbent is H(E[θ|s]). Hence the average vote share is given by:
AV S =
∑
j∈{L,M,H}
Pr(θj)
∫
H(E[θ|s]) g(s|θ˜j)ds (19)
and the difference in the average vote share between the incumbent and the challenger is
y = AV S − (1− AV S)
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